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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail e¤ect, where a popular can-
didate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political
party for other branches of government. I assume a political agency framework with
moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail e¤ect in simultaneous presidential and con-
gressional elections. I show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection
scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicianse¤orts in a retrospective
voting environment. I assume that an o¢ ce-motivated politician (executive or member
of congress) prefers her counterpart to be a¢ liated with the same political party. This
correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule,
which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or to di¤erent par-
ties. Two-sided coattail e¤ects then arise. On the one hand, an executives success props
up, while failure drags down, her partisan ally in the congressional election, which im-
plies a presidential coattail e¤ect. On the other hand, the executives reelection itself is
a¤ected by a congress members performance, which results in a reverse coattail e¤ect.
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1. Introduction
The coattail e¤ect is dened as the tendency of a popular candidate for one level of government
to attract votes to candidates from the same political party for other levels of government.
The presidential coattail e¤ect, where a congressional voting decision is a¤ected by an exec-
utives performance, has been a topic of frequent study in the empirical literature (see Miller
1955, Press 1958, Kaplowitz 1971, Calvert and Ferejohn 1983, Campbell 1986, Campbell
and Sumners 1990, Flemming 1995, Cohen et al. 2000, Mattei and Glasgow 2005, Gélineau
and Remmer 2006, and Golder 2006, among many others). Other studies have reported ev-
idence of reverse coattail e¤ects, where popular lower-tier candidates prop up their parties
candidates for higher levels of government (Ames 1994, Samuels 2000a, Samuels 2000b).1
While a number of studies have identied and measured coattail e¤ects, "there remains
a great deal of uncertainty concerning the causal mechanism responsible for these e¤ects."2
Mondak and McCurley (1994) suggested that coattail e¤ects arise mainly owing to "voters
reliance on a specic cognitive e¢ ciency mechanism" and tested this claim empirically at the
individual-voter level.3 There is, however, no formal model of coattail voting, to the best of
my knowledge.
In this paper, coattail e¤ects are explained within a retrospective voting model (i.e., a
political agency model with moral hazard). In my framework, coattail voting arises as an
outcome of the optimal implicit reward scheme that voters use to induce politicianse¤orts.
I consider a representative voter who has to elect an executive and a member of congress
in simultaneous elections. Politicians want to be reelected, and are held accountable for their
performance at the moment of election. The politicians therefore have incentives to satisfy the
voters wishes. In addition, I assume that the politicians are loyal to their respective political
parties: an executive prefers her partisan ally to win in the congressional election, and vice
versa.4 Hence, the incentives of the executive and the congress member are correlated. The
1These publications provide evidence of reverse coattail e¤ects in Brazil. Broockman (2009), however, found
no evidence of reverse coattail e¤ects in congressional district-level data from the US presidential elections
between 1952 and 2004.
2Hogan (2005), p. 587.
3Mondak and McCurley (1994), p. 151.
4Several authors have made similar assumptions about politicianspartisan preferences. According to Fox
and Van Weelden (2010), the legislature ("overseer") may seek to damage the reputation of an executive from
another party while seeking to protect the reputation of an executive from his own party. Brollo and Nannicini
(2010) assumed that an executive wants to maximize "the political capital represented by aligned mayors" by
increasing the likelihood that a municipality is run by a mayor aligned with the central government. Fréchette
et al. (2008) assumed that the party leaders objective is to maximize the reelection chances of the partys
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voter cares about the politicians performance, which is observable but not contractible.
The voter evaluates the incumbentsperformance and votes accordingly. More precisely, the
voter employs implicit evaluation rules when deciding whether to reward (reelect) politicians.
Obviously, the voter can inuence the politiciansbehavior through the choice of evaluation
rules. In this paper, the space of possible evaluation rules is restricted to linear functions of
performance.
I show that given the correlation between the two politiciansincentives, the voter is better
o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule (conditioned on the incumbents belonging
to the same party or to di¤erent parties) rather than an individual-politician performance
evaluation rule. In particular, the voter evaluates the performance of an executive and a
congress member from the same party as a team. If the executive and congress member
belong to di¤erent parties, then the voter compares their performances to create a competitive
environment. This combination of coattail voting rules implies that improved performance
increases a politicians own reelection probability, while increasing/decreasing the reelection
probability of that politicians partisan ally/rival for the other o¢ ce. Politicians therefore
have an extra incentive to perform better, for the sake of their party as well as for themselves.
In equilibrium, the reelection outcomes for incumbents from the same party are therefore
positively correlated: the voter tends to reward/punish one incumbent for the good/poor
performance of the other incumbent. Two-sided coattail e¤ects therefore arise. On the one
hand, the executives performance a¤ects the congress members reelection, which gives rise
to a presidential coattail e¤ect. On the other hand, the executives reelection depends on the
congress members performance, which results in a reverse coattail e¤ect.
The equilibrium reelection outcomes for incumbents from di¤erent parties are negatively
correlated: the voter is more likely to punish one incumbent the better the performance of the
other incumbent. In particular, an executives good performance drags down an incumbent
congress members reelection chances and therefore props up the executives partisan ally in
the congressional election, which implies a presidential coattail e¤ect. In turn, the congress
members success reduces the executives reelection chances and thus promotes for presidential
o¢ ce a candidate partisanly aligned with the congress member. As a result, a reverse coattail
e¤ect arises.
These results rest on the assumption of politicians partisan alignment ; that is, it is
assumed that executives and congress members prefer their partisan ally to win in the other
incumbent politicians. In turn, Persico et al. (2007) modeled the hierarchy of party members as a "patron
client relationship," where a lower-tier politician (the "client") supports a higher-tier politician (the "patron")
for promotion.
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election. Coattail voting rules then serve as an extra tool to discipline the politicians. If
the assumption of partisan alignment is relaxed, this e¤ect vanishes and the voter no longer
evaluates incumbents jointly. Instead, the voter uses a cuto¤ rule that each incumbent is
reappointed only when her individual performance exceeds a critical threshold. There is then
no coattail e¤ect.
I turn now to the fundamental question of why political process is modeled as political
agency. In addition to a sound theoretical framework, this approach has received considerable
empirical support (see, for example, Peltzman 1992 and Besley and Case 1995a, 1995b, 2003).
Besley (2006) provided an excellent introduction to political agency models and "emphasizes
the empirical potential of these models in explaining real world policy choices."5 In a recent
article in the New York Times, Glaeser pointed out that the "president ... is both our leader
and our employee. We (the voters) chose him, our taxes pay his salary, and we can re him
in four years."6 The political agency approach may therefore be appropriate for modeling
political interactions between politicians and voters. Even so, elected politicians can only
be o¤ered implicit incentive schemes; it is di¢ cult to reward public policies with explicit
contracts.
The retrospective voting model used here goes back to Barro (1973). Ferejohn (1986) ex-
tended the model and studied subgame perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria. Persson
et al. (1997) used a retrospective voting approach to study rent extraction. In Austen-Smith
and Banks (1989), voters adopt retrospective voting strategies that are conditioned on the
di¤erence between the incumbents performance and her initial policy platform. Banks and
Sundaram (1993, 1996) analyzed retrospective voting settings with both moral hazard and
adverse selection, and with term limits. In turn, Kessing (2010) addressed the question of
federalism in a retrospective voting setup with randomly distorted election choices.
The results presented in this paper are also related to the literature on horizontal and
vertical intergovernmental competition. Most analyses of horizontal competition are based
on the assumption of interjurisdictional mobility of consumers, à la Tiebout (1956). In a
similar vein, the literature on yardstick competition between jurisdictions started with the
seminal work of Salmon (1987), to be followed by Besley and Case (1995a), Bordignon et al.
(2004), Sand-Zantman (2004), Belleamme and Hindriks (2005), Besley and Smart (2007),
and others. The main assumption of this literature is that under decentralization, voters use
5Besley (2006), p. 3.
6Edward L. Glaeser "Lower (and More Realistic) Presidential Expectations," January 20, 2009. Available
online at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/lower-and-more-realistic-presidential-expectations/
(accessed December 1, 2010).
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comparative performance evaluation between di¤erent local governments to create yardstick
competition.
The vertical-competition literature, on the other hand, assumes that "senior and junior
governments provide similar or comparable services, and that o¢ ce-holders in the government
which is judged by citizens to be the more e¢ cient supplier will increase their probability
of getting the vote of these citizens"7 (Breton 1996, Breton and Fraschini 2003, Breton and
Salmon 2001, Volden 2005, 2007). I follow these authors in assuming that voters compare the
performance of local and regional governments, and are likely to reward the more e¢ cient
politicians with reelection. There is, however, an important di¤erence between my research
and the papers just cited. In the intergovernmental-competition literature, the result of the
comparative performance evaluation is driven by either correlated shocks or interjurisdic-
tional spillover. In my model, the joint performance evaluation arises from the fact that the
politiciansincentives are correlated: each politician cares not only about her own reelection
prospects but also about the success of other politicians a¢ liated with the same political
party.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model. Section
3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider a representative voter who has to elect an executive E and a congress member C
in simultaneous elections. The politicians running for the two o¢ ces belong to one of two
political parties. I assume that there is exactly one candidate from each party the incumbent
and an opponent  in each election. The opponents are identical to the incumbents in all
respects except party label. There is no ideological heterogeneity in politicianspreferences.8
The participation constraints of the politicians are always satised.
While in o¢ ce, each politician i 2 fE;Cg has to implement a policy determined by her
unobservable e¤ort ai. The set of e¤orts available to each politician is taken to be a non-
degenerate interval [0; a]  R. I assume that the performance of politician i, pi, is observed
with an independent, unobservable noise "i:
pi = ai + "i;
7Breton and Salmon (2001), p. 139.
8Since there is no ideological component, it is convenient to consider a single representative voter in this
framework.
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where "i  N
 
0; 2

.9,10,11
The reward of politician i is denoted by i (ai). E¤ort is costly, and the standard convex
cost function a
2
i
2 is assumed here.
12 The executive and the congress member independently
choose e¤ort levels ai to maximize their utility, which is given by
i (ai)  a
2
i
2
:
The function i (ai) will be dened explicitly in Subsection 2.1.
The voter cares about the politiciansperformances according to a linear utility function
pE + pC :
I assume that the voter applies retrospective reappointment rules to reelect the incumbents,
i.e., the voter bases the reappointment decision on the politiciansperformances pE and pC .
I denote the state variable by  2 fS;Dg. Here,  = S corresponds to the case where the
executive E and congress member C are members of the same party, and  = D corresponds
to the case where E and C are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties.13
This is a sequential political agency game between politicians (the executive and the
congress member) and a representative voter. The timing of events is as follows. First,
the incumbents are drawn randomly, and a state  2 fS;Dg is realized. Second, the voter
commits to the reappointment rules to be used in the coming elections. Third, the politicians
9An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the two noise terms "E and "C are
correlated and follow a bivariate normal distribution. I want to concentrate, however, on the case where
the voter introduces joint performance evaluation owing to the correlation between politicians incentives
rather than the correlation between shocks. The latter topic has been widely studied in the context of team
evaluation in contract theory (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and in the literature on
yardstick competition (see the references on yardstick competition in the Introduction).
10One can assume that policy outcomes are determined by e¤ort and ability (rather than by e¤ort and
noise). The results are qualitatively the same if politicians choose their e¤orts before knowing their abilities.
Otherwise, one has to solve an asymmetric information model. This extension is left for future research.
11Alternatively, the voter might not be able to distinguish between the politicians performances, and
therefore would observe just their aggregate performance p = aE + aC + ". In that case the politicians
would face a free-riding problem, as each of them contributes a costly e¤ort to an aggregate output. The
analysis of this alternative framework is left for future research.
12An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the cost of policy implementation for an
executive and a congress member from the same party is di¤erent from that for politicians from rival parties
(e.g., because of synergy). The results of this extended model are qualitatively the same.
13Another way to interpret the state variable  is in terms of unied and divided government.  = S then
corresponds to the case of unied government, and  = D corresponds to the case of divided government. For
the literature on divided government, see Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), Chari et al. (1997), Degan and Merlo
(2011), Fiorina (1996), Ingberman and Villani (1993), and Jacobson (1990), among many others.
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exert e¤orts aE and aC . Finally, nature chooses noises "E and "C , and the politicians
performances pE and pC are observed. Both elections take place simultaneously and the
voter applies the selected reappointment rules to reward or punish the incumbents.14
The politicianspreferences are described in the following subsection. The paper then
turns to the voters problem and denes an equilibrium concept.
2.1. Politicians
The politicians preferences are as follows. First, the executive E and congress member
C want to be reelected. Moreover, E wants to improve her partys representation in the
legislature. If C and E belong to the same party, then E prefers C to be reelected. Otherwise,
E wants a new congress member (from her own party) to be elected for the next term.
Likewise, C wants to improve his partys chances of winning the presidential election. Thus,
C wants E to be reelected if the two are members of the same party, and wants the opponent
to be appointed if E is from the rival party. The value of holding o¢ ce is normalized to 1.
The values which E and C associate with their partieswinning the other election are denoted
by E and C , respectively. The probability of winning election i 2 fE;Cg is denoted by
Pri (). Therefore, politician i has the following reward function i : [0; a]2 ! R, which
depends continuously on both politicianse¤orts:
i (ai; aj ; ) =
8<: Pri (ai; aj) + i Prj (ai; aj) if  = S;
Pri (ai; aj) + i (1  Prj (ai; aj)) if  = D;
where i; j 2 fE;Cg and j 6= i. The preferences stated above reect the politiciansallegiance
to their respective parties; individual politicians care about their partys overall representation
in the executive and legislative branches of government, and not just their own reelection
prospects.15,16 Still, it is a reasonable assumption here that a politician values her own o¢ ce
more than her partys representation in the other o¢ ce, i.e., 0  i  1.17 I call i the degree
14This model can be extended to several periods. I want to concentrate, however, on votersmotives for
coattail voting rather than on dynamic political agency. A static model su¢ ces for this task.
15Alternatively, these preferences could arise because the executive and the congress member have to interact
while in o¢ ce. Each prefers to work with a member of her own party rather than with a rival.
16The literature has emphasized the role of parties as a coordination device, such that the partiesleaders
can coordinate the strategies of their members (Morelli 2004). So a way to interpret the preferences of the
incumbents stated here is to say that the partiesleaders coordinate their membersactions by assigning s.
17 In other words, politician i does not mind reducing her reelection chances by 1% in exchange for increasing
her allys election probability by 1
i
%  1%.
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of politician is loyalty to her party (or the strength of her partisan alignment).18
2.2. Representative Voter
The politiciansperformances pE and pC (but not their composition between e¤ort and noise)
are observed but are not contractible. It is di¢ cult to reward public policies with explicit
contracts. It is more natural to use implicit incentive contracting in this situation.
The voter observes the politiciansperformances pE and pC , and in the elections rewards
incumbents according to their performance; i.e., the voter reappoints incumbents who have
shown "good" results. If an incumbent is thrown out of o¢ ce, an opponent from the rival
party is elected.
Obviously, the voter can inuence the politiciansbehavior through the choice of evalua-
tion rules. Intuitively, since politicians care about each others reelection chances, the reward
rules should allow joint performance evaluation. Under joint performance evaluation, the
voter conditions politician is reelection on her own performance pi (giving her an incentive
to perform well, since she wants to be reelected) and on the performance pj of politician j
(giving an incentive to politician j, since he cares about is reelection chances).
The functional space of the performance evaluation rules is restricted to linear joint eval-
uation rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC). E and C are the slopes of the executives and the
congress members performance evaluation rules, respectively, and bE and bC are the corre-
sponding intercepts; E ; C ; bE ; bC 2 R, jEC j  1.19 Under rules (i; bi), i 2 fE;Cg, the
probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big)
with i; j 2 fE;Cg and j 6= i. Figure 1 depicts the possible outcomes for E and C under
rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC) in the two-dimensional space of the observed performances pE
and pC . Note that it is required that jEC j  1, so that the line pE + EpC = bE is steeper
than the line pC + CpE = bC . Otherwise, as one can see from Figure 1, an executive and
18An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the strength of partisan alignment
i might vary between states. If there is some preference for incumbents over unknown candidates, then
Si  Di . (This case reects the idea that an executive or a congress member might prefer an incumbent
ally to an unknown ally for the other o¢ ce.) If politicians prefer newcomers, then Si < 
D
i . (In this case an
executive or a congress member would like a new ally (a newcomer) to be elected for the other o¢ ce.) The
results of this extended model are qualitatively the same.
19Linear evaluation rules allow a closed-form solution in this framework. The analysis of general evaluation
rules is left for future research.
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a congress member with poor performance would be reelected, while politicians with better
performance would not.
Note that under linear rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC), E is reelected when "E + E"C 
bE   aE   EaC , where "E + E"C  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2E

2

. In turn, C is reelected when
"C + C"E  bC   aC   CaE , where "C + C"E  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2C

2

. The two reelection
outcomes are independent when E = 0 and C = 0, positively correlated when E > 0 and
C > 0, and negatively correlated when E < 0 and C < 0. Throughout the rest of the
paper, F will be used to denote the normal distribution function, and f for the corresponding
density.
2.3. Equilibrium Concept
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. First, I solve for
the politicianse¤orts aE and a

C under rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC) in each state . Second,
I examine the voters choice of evaluation rules

E ; b

E

and

C ; b

C

for each state . Two
denitions will now be introduced.
Given linear performance evaluation rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC), the equilibrium in e¤ort
strategies is a prole of e¤orts

aE ; a

C

such that
i

ai ; a

j ; 

  a
2
i
2
 i

ai; a

j ; 

  a
2
i
2
for each ai 2 [0; a] ;
where i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j.
An equilibrium in rule strategies is dened as a tuple

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

such that
aE

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

+aC

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

= max
E ;bE ;C ;bC
jEC j1
aE (E ; bE ; C ; bC)+a

C (E ; bE ; C ; bC) ;
where

aE () ; aC ()

is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies.
2.4. Intuition
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, some intuitive considerations will be discussed.
The incumbents care about each others reelection chances, which provides the voter with
an additional tool to discipline them. The voter then uses joint performance evaluation to
increase the politiciansaccountability. Intuitively, the voter rewards an incumbent from one
branch of government not only for her own performance but also for the performance of the
incumbent from the other branch of government. That joint evaluation gives extra incentives
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for the latter incumbent to perform better, since he cares about the reelection prospects of
the former incumbent.
Such an evaluation strategy of the voter leads to coattail e¤ects. Intuitively, an executive
wants a congress member from the same party to be elected. The executive will perform bet-
ter if her own performance increases the reelection chances of an allied incumbent congress
member and decreases those of a rival incumbent congress member. The voter uses this
correlation of incentives, and rewards (reelects) the incumbent congress member for the ex-
ecutives good performance if the politicians are members of the same party. However, the
voter punishes the incumbent congress member for the executives good performance if the
politicians are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties. In this case, an opponent candidate (from the
same party as the executive) is elected in the congressional election. Note that a presidential
coattail e¤ect arises here. The good performance of an incumbent executive leads not only
to her own reelection but also to the election of a congress member from the same party, who
"rides on the executives coattails". If an incumbent executive shows poor performance in
o¢ ce, her reelection chances decrease, and likewise the election chances of a congress member
from the same party. In this case there is a negative presidential coattail e¤ect.
The same intuition (in reverse) shows the emergence of a reverse coattail e¤ect. Since a
congress member wants a partisan ally to be elected for presidential o¢ ce, he has an extra
incentive to exert higher e¤ort if the reelection chances of an allied executive increase and
those of a rival executive decrease with an increase in his performance. The voter knows this
and is more likely to reelect an incumbent executive a¢ liated with the same party as the
congress member if the congress member performs well. If the incumbents belong to di¤erent
parties, then the voter tends to punish the incumbent executive for good performance by the
congress member, which leads to the election of a challenger (a¢ liated with the same party
as the congress member) for executive o¢ ce. The executive thus may either benet or su¤er
from a reverse coattail e¤ect because her reelection is a¤ected by the congress members
performance. Good performance by a congress member props up, while poor performance
drags down, a candidate from the same political party for executive o¢ ce.
Note that these coattail e¤ects arise because of the correlation of politiciansincentives
such that each politician prefers her partisan ally to win the other election. Relaxing this
assumption results in a prediction of no coattail e¤ects. Indeed, if politicians care just about
their own reelection, the voter will reward them only for their own performance, so no coattail
voting arises.
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3. Analysis
In this section, the game is analyzed backwards to nd a subgame perfect equilibrium. First,
an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies is characterized, and then an equilibrium in rule strategies.
3.1. Equilibrium in E¤ort Strategies
The voter uses evaluation rules (i; bi), i; j 2 fE;Cg. Under these rules, politician is utility
is
i (ai; aj ; )  a
2
i
2
=8<: P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + iP
 
pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj
	  a2i2 if  = S;
P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + i
 
1  P  pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj	  a2i2 if  = D:
Politician i chooses an e¤ort ai before observing a realization of the noise, and takes
the voters expectations as given. The proposition below establishes the existence of an
equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. The continuity properties of the politiciansbest response
functions and Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem are used to obtain the result. Proofs of this
and other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Under linear performance evaluation rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC) with jEC j 
1, there exists an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies

aE ; a

C

if the following second-order con-
ditions are satised:8><>:
 f 0"i+i"j

bi   ai   iaj

  i2jf 0"j+j"i

bj   aj   jai

  1 < 0 if  = S;
 f 0"i+i"j

bi   ai   iaj

+ i
2
jf"j+j"i

bj   aj   jai

  1 < 0 if  = D;
(3.1)
where i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. This equilibrium is dened implicitly by8><>:
f"i+i"j

bi   ai   iaj

+ ijf"j+j"i

bj   aj   jai

  ai = 0 if  = S;
f"i+i"j

bi   ai   iaj

  ijf"j+j"i

bj   aj   jai

  ai = 0 if  = D:
Figure 2 depicts the politicians best response functions in states S and D for three
scenarios: independent reelection outcomes with E = 0 and C = 0 (black), positively
correlated reelection outcomes with E > 0 and C > 0 (red), and negatively correlated
reelection outcomes with E < 0 and C < 0 (blue), while bE and bC are xed. Note that for
independent reelection outcomes (black), the best responses are at in both states (since each
politicians reelection depends only on her own e¤ort). For positively correlated reelection
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outcomes (red), the best responses shift upwards if the politicians are members of the same
party ( = S) and downwards if the politicians are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties ( = D).
Intuitively, for positively correlated reelection outcomes, a politician has an extra incentive
to exert e¤ort if  = S (to increase her partisan allys reelection chances) and less incentive
if  = D (to avoid helping her partisan rival get reelected). Finally, for negatively correlated
reelection outcomes (blue), the best responses shift downwards if the politicians belong to the
same party ( = S) and upwards if the politicians are a¢ liated with rival parties ( = D).
In this scenario, a politician does not want to damage her partisan allys reelection prospects,
and so exerts a lower e¤ort if  = S. However, if  = D, the politician has an extra incentive
to work harder in order to reduce her partisan rivals reelection chances.
Note that in the case of positively correlated reelection outcomes there is a free-riding
e¤ect between partisan allies ( = S). Intuitively, politician i might prefer to exert a lower
e¤ort (and reduce the cost of that e¤ort) if her partisan ally j is performing well enough to
improve is reelection prospects. In fact, i "rides on the other incumbents coattails".
3.2. Equilibrium in Rule Strategies
I turn now to the voters choice of the evaluation rules (E ; bE) and (C ; bC). Maximizing a

E+
aC with respect to E , bE , C and bC yields an equilibrium in rule strategies

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

given by

i ; b

i

=
8><>:

j ; a

i + ja

j

if  = S;
 j ; ai   jaj

if  = D;
(3.2)
where i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. The politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai in each state are equal to
ai =
1p
2
0@ 1q
1 + 2j
+
2iq
1 + 2i
1A : (3.3)
It is important to point out that the second-order conditions (3.1) hold for

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

.
The equilibrium in e¤ort strategies described in Subsection 3.1 is therefore well dened.
The voter is rational, and so realizes that the only alternative to reelecting incumbents
is to vote for opponents from rival parties. The politicians performances are additively
separable in e¤ort and noise, and all politicians behave in the same way irrespective of
the noise. If elected, an opponent i will exert an equilibrium e¤ort ai , which maximizes
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her expected utility. Thus, the voter compares the incumbents performances with their
opponentsexpected performances and votes accordingly. That is why, in equilibrium,
bi = a

i + 

i a

j :
According to Proposition 2, if politician j is loyal to his political party (i.e., j 6= 0), the
voter adopts a coattail voting rule to reelect politician i. The probability of i being reelected
to o¢ ce under this rule is equal to
Pri (ai; aj ; ) =
8><>:
P
n
pi (ai) + jpj (aj)  ai + jaj
o
if  = S;
P
n
pi (ai)  jpj (aj)  ai   jaj
o
if  = D:
Intuitively, the incentives of an executive and a congress member are correlated, because
they care about the overall representation of their party in both branches of government.
The voter therefore rewards politicians jointly rather than separately.
If the politicians belong to the same political party ( = S), then the voter uses a
coattail voting rule under which the reelection of politician i is positively correlated with
the performance of politician j (i > 0). As a result, the voter evaluates the performance
of politicians from the same party as a team and tends to reward incumbents from a well
performing party and punish incumbents from a badly performing party. However, if the
politicians belong to di¤erent parties ( = D), the voter uses a coattail voting rule under
which the reelection of politician i is negatively correlated with the performance of politician
j (i < 0). As a result, the voter compares the performance of one politician with that
of the other, creating a competitive environment between the parties. In this scenario, the
voter tends to reward the incumbent from the better-performing party, while punishing the
incumbent from the worse-performing party. In sum, owing to the correlation between the
executives and congress members incentives such that they care about their partys chances
of holding o¢ ce, the voter is better o¤ adopting party performance evaluation rather than
individual performance evaluation.
This leads to two-sided coattail e¤ects. On the one hand, an executives good perfor-
mance props up, while poor performance drags down, a congress member candidate from the
same party. A presidential coattail e¤ect then arises. On the other hand, the executives
own reelection depends on the congress members performance, which gives rise to a reverse
coattail e¤ect. Indeed, successful performance by a congress member advances the election
of his partisan ally for executive o¢ ce, whereas a congress members failures hinder it.
Note that the intensity of the coattail e¤ects depends on the strength of the politicians
partisan alignment. The more loyal the executive is to her political party (the higher E
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is), the more correlated the optimal reward scheme for the congress member is with the
executives performance (positively if  = S or negatively if  = D). The presidential coattail
e¤ect therefore becomes more intense. Analogously, the greater the partisan alignment of the
congress member (the higher C is), the more correlated the executives reelection is with
the congress members performance. So the reverse coattail e¤ect becomes stronger.
If the politicians care equally about their own reelection chances and their partys election
chances, then the best reward schemes are perfectly correlated: incumbents from the same
party are always reelected or dismissed together. In the case of incumbents from di¤erent
parties, reelection of one implies dismissal of the other.
The less loyal the politicians are to their political parties, the less correlated are their
incentives. As a result, the voter adopts less correlated reelection rules in equilibrium, and
the coattail e¤ects lessen. If politician j is not at all loyal to his political party (j = 0), then
the optimal rule for reappointing politician i is a simple cuto¤ rule: politician i is reappointed
only if her observed performance exceeds a critical threshold given by the equilibrium e¤ort
in this o¢ ce. That is, the probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce depends only on is
performance:
Pri (ai) = P (fpi (ai)  ai g) :
Intuitively, when politicians care only about their own reelection prospects, the voter is
better o¤ rewarding politiciansindividual performances rather than the partys performance.
So the coattail e¤ects vanish. Indeed, if an executive cares only about her own reelection
(E = 0), then her performance does not a¤ect a congress members reelection chances, and
the presidential coattail e¤ect disappears. In turn, the performance of a nonpartisan congress
member (C = 0) has no impact on an executives reelection. So a reverse coattail e¤ect does
not arise if the incumbent congress member cares only about his own reelection prospects.
How do the equilibrium e¤orts ai in (3.3) depend on the values of the parameters? First, a
larger variance 2 of the noise decreases the politicianse¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness
in the observed performances pE and pC makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive to
e¤ort, reducing the politiciansincentives. Second, if politician is partisan alignment i is
strengthened, the equilibrium e¤ort of politician i, ai , increases while that of politician j, a

j ,
decreases. Intuitively, the more politician i cares about her allys appointment to o¢ ce j,
the more incentive she has to perform better. However, this weakens politician js incentive
to exert e¤ort, because his reelection becomes less sensitive to his own e¤ort. Note that
partisan executive and congress member exert the same equilibrium e¤ort as politicians from
di¤erent parties. The reason is that the politicianspreferences are symmetric between the
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states. The voter therefore adopts symmetric strategies, and the politicians exert the same
equilibrium e¤ort regardless of the state.
3.3. Equilibrium Election Probabilities
In this subsection I calculate the equilibrium probabilities of election of partisanly aligned
candidates and of election of candidates a¢ liated with di¤erent parties. The probability
that candidates from the same party are elected in the state  is denoted by PS , and the
probability that candidates from di¤erent parties are elected in the state  by PD. I establish
the following result.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium probability of election of partisanly aligned candidates is
given by
PS =
1
2
+
1

(arctanE + arctanC) ,  2 fS;Dg ,
where arctan () is the arctangent function. The equilibrium probability of election of candi-
dates a¢ liated with di¤erent parties is given by
PD =
1
2
  1

(arctanE + arctanC) ,  2 fS;Dg .
Note that, independently of the incumbentsparty labels, the election of partisanly aligned
candidates is more likely than that of candidates a¢ liated with di¤erent political parties.
Indeed, the probability of election of candidates from di¤erent parties is never greater than
1
2 : PD 2

0; 12

. Intuitively, if the politicians belong to the same party ( = S), the
voter adopts a coattail voting rule under which the incumbents reelection outcomes are
positively correlated: good performance by one incumbent tends to prop up, while poor
performance drags down, her incumbent partisan ally in the other election. As a result,
the incumbents are more likely to be reelected together or dismissed together than they
are to receive opposite rewards. Thus, partisanly aligned candidates are more likely to be
elected in both branches of government. If the incumbents are members of di¤erent parties
( = D), then the voter uses a coattail voting rule under which their reelection outcomes are
negatively correlated: good performance by one incumbent increases, while poor performance
decreases, the opponents chances of winning in the other election. Thus, it is more likely
that one incumbent will be dismissed while the other is reelected, and, again, partisanly
aligned candidates are more likely to be elected in both branches of government. To conrm
this intuition, the politiciansreelection outcomes under equilibrium rules E and 

C in the
two-dimensional space of performances pE and pC are depicted in Figure 3. The density
function of the joint distribution of pE and pC is symmetric around (aE ; a

C).
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The probability of election of politicians from the same party, PS , increases with E and
C . This probability takes its maximum value of 1 when E = C = 1, and its minimum
value of 12 when E = C = 0. Intuitively, the more aligned politicians are with their parties,
the more correlated (positively if  = S or negatively if  = D) the optimal performance
evaluation rules are. The election of partisanly aligned candidates is more probable in both
states, as explained above, so stronger party alignment just increases the probability of this
outcome. Note, furthermore, that this probability does not vary between states, owing to the
symmetry of the politicianspreferences (which in turn implies symmetry of the performance
evaluation rules that the voter adopts in equilibrium).
3.4. Discussion
The results above show that coattail voting is in fact a tool that the voter uses to discipline
partisan politicians. The model generates both presidential and reverse coattail e¤ects. Since
an executive wants her party to be represented in the legislature, in order to give her an extra
incentive the voter adopts a coattail voting rule such that the executives good performance
promotes the election of her partisan ally in the congressional election. As a result, a pres-
idential coattail e¤ect arises. In turn, the congress members partisan preferences lead to a
reverse coattail e¤ect. The voter rewards or punishes the executive for the congress members
performance in order to incentivize the latter, who wants to increase his partys chances of
winning presidential o¢ ce.
I must stress that, in the model, coattail e¤ects arise only if politicians are aligned with
their political parties (in the sense that they want their party to win in both branches of
government). So it is important to examine the assumption of partisan preferences of politi-
cians at di¤erent levels of government. The literature on the allocation of intergovernmental
transfers provides support for this assumption. According to Cox and McCubbins (1986),
incumbents may use intergovernmental transfers to increase their reelection probability by
allocating funds to districts with their supporters. An alignment between the two levels of
government thus increases the amount of transfers because the central government favors its
partisan allies and penalizes its partisan rivals. The recent empirical literature provides evi-
dence in favor of this hypothesis (Arulampalam et al. 2009 (India), Brollo and Nannicini 2010
(Brazil), Larcinese et al. 2006 (United States), Rozevitch and Weiss 1993 (Israel), Solé-Ollé
and Sorribas-Navarro 2008 (Spain), and Veiga and Pinho 2007 (Portugal)). Therefore the
assumption of partisan preferences of politicians is more than reasonable. On the one hand,
lower-tier politicians prefer their partisan ally to take executive o¢ ce in the hope of receiving
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more generous transfers. On the other hand, an executive allocates more funds to districts
governed by her partisan allies exactly because she wants lower-tier politicians to be aligned
with the central government. And the executive wants this "either because local politicians
are important opinion leaders and they may turn to be useful allies in the next presidential
campaign, or because they may engage in rent-seeking activities for the President."20
4. Conclusion
This paper has studied coattail e¤ects in simultaneous presidential and congressional elec-
tions. In a political agency model with moral hazard, coattail voting is an additional tool
that voters use to motivate politicianse¤orts.
The politiciansincentives are assumed to be correlated, as an executive/congress mem-
ber prefers her counterpart (the congress member/executive) to be a¢ liated with the same
political party. A representative voter is therefore better o¤ adopting a joint performance
evaluation rule rather than an individual performance evaluation rule when deciding whether
to reward the incumbents. Under a joint rule, I have shown that the reelection outcomes
for politicians from the same party will be positively correlated and the reelection outcomes
for politicians from di¤erent parties will be negatively correlated. Two-sided coattail e¤ects
therefore result. On the one hand, a presidential coattail e¤ect arises, as the executives
success/failure props up/drags down a candidate from the same party in the congressional
election. On the other hand, the executives reelection itself depends on the congress mem-
bers performance, which implies a reverse coattail e¤ect.
I have focused on single-task policies. However, in reality, public policies pursue many
goals. So it would be of interest to study coattail voting under the more realistic assumption
of a multiple-task policy, where the problem of e¤ort allocation among tasks can create policy
trade-o¤s. One can also add an adverse selection problem by assuming that a politicians
performance is determined both by e¤ort and by her privately known ability. These tasks
are left for future research.
20Brollo and Nannicini (2010), p. 6.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Under linear performance evaluation rules (i; bi), the probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce
is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (f"i + i"j  bi   ai   iajg) = 1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) ;
where the noises "i and "j (i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j) are independent normally distributed random
variables, and so, by the convolution formula, "i + i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

. Politician is
utility is
i (ai; aj ; )  a
2
i
2
=8><>:
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + i

1  F"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if  = S;
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + iF"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if  = D:
The rst-order conditions with respect to the actual e¤ort ai, taking (i; bi) and
 
j ; bj

as
given, are8<: f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + ijf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if  = S;
f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj)  ijf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if  = D:
The second-order conditions are8<:  f
0
"i+i"j
(bi   ai   iaj)  i2jf 0"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  1 < 0 if  = S;
 f 0"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + i
2
jf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  1 < 0 if  = D: (A.1)
I dene the best response functions by Ri : [0; a]! [0; a] such that
Ri (aj) = arg max
ai2[0;a]
i (ai; aj ; )  a
2
i
2
:
The best response functions are then determined implicitly by the rst-order conditions8><>:
f"i+i"j

bi  Ri (aj)  iaj

+ ijf"j+j"i

bj   aj   jRi (aj)

 Ri (aj) = 0 if  = S;
f"i+i"j

bi  Ri (aj)  iaj

  ijf"j+j"i

bj   aj   jRi (aj)

 Ri (aj) = 0 if  = D:
Since i (ai; aj ; )  a
2
i
2 is continuous, R

i (aj) is continuous. Therefore, a composite function
Ri  Rj : [0; a] ! [0; a] (dened as

Ri Rj

(ai) = R

i

Rj (ai)

) is a continuous function
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from [0; a] into itself, where [0; a] is a nonempty, compact, convex set. Then, by Brouwers
Fixed Point Theorem, Ri  Rj has a xed point; that is, there exists ai 2 [0; a] such that
ai =

Ri Rj

ai

. So there exists a prole

aE ; a

C

such that aE = R

E

aC

and
aC = R

C

aE

. This implies that

aE ; a

C

is such that
i

ai ; a

j ; 

  a
2
i
2
= max
ai2[0;a]
i

ai; a

j ; 

  a
2
i
2
;
where i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. Thus,

aE ; a

C

is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies if it satises
the second-order conditions (A.1), which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The voter chooses (E ; bE) and (C ; bC) to maximize
aE + a

C =8><>:
(1 + CE) f"E+E"C

bE   aE   EaC

+ (1 + EC) f"C+C"E

bC   aC   CaE

if  = S;
(1  CE) f"E+E"C

bE   aE   EaC

+ (1  EC) f"C+C"E

bC   aC   CaE

if  = D:
One can show that the values
bE = a

E + Ea

C ;
bC = a

C + Ca

E
maximize aE + a

C in the state  = S if 1 + ji  0 and maximize aE + aC in the state
 = D if 1  ji  0, i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. This yields
aE + a

C =
8>>><>>>:
1p
2

1+CEp
1+2E
+ 1+ECp
1+2C

if  = S;
1p
2

1 CEp
1+2E
+ 1 ECp
1+2C

if  = D:
Maximizing aE + a

C with respect to E and C yields the slopes of the equilibrium perfor-
mance evaluation rules
i =
8<: j if  = S; j if  = D;
where i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. Note that in the state  = S, the condition 1 + jSi  0 is
satised, and in the state  = D, the condition 1   jDi  0 is satised. Therefore the
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intercepts of the equilibrium performance evaluation rules are given by
bi =
8<: a

i + ja

j if  = S;
ai   jaj if  = D;
where ai = a

i

E ; b

E ; 

C ; b

C

is the politiciansequilibrium e¤orts, which do not depend
on the current state . The rest of the proof is straightforward.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The reelection of an incumbent i is determined by a random variable "i+i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

,
i; j 2 fE;Cg, i 6= j. The density function of a bivariate normal distribution of random vari-
ables "E + E"C and "C + C"E , denoted by f"E+E"C ;"C+C"E (x; y), is
f"E+E"C ;"C+C"E (x; y) =
1
22
q
(EC   1)2
exp
(
 (x  yE)
2 + (y   xC)2
22 (EC   1)2
)
:
In the state  = S, partisanly aligned candidates are elected either when both incumbents
are reappointed or when neither of them is reappointed (so, opponents from the rival party
are elected). Denote by pi = a

i + "i the performance of politician i in equilibrium. The
equilibrium election probabilities in the state  = S are given by
PSS = P (fpE + CpC  aE + CaCg \ fpC + EpE  aC + EaEg)+
P (fpE + CpC < aE + CaCg \ fpC + EpE < aC + EaEg) =
P (f"E + C"C  0g \ f"C + E"E  0g)+
P (f"E + C"C < 0g \ f"C + E"E < 0g) =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"E+C"C ;"C+E"E (x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"E+C"C ;"C+E"E (x; y) dxdy =
1
2 +
1
 (arctanE + arctanC) ;
PSD = 1  PSS = 12   1 (arctanE + arctanC) :
In the state  = D, candidates from di¤erent parties are elected when both incumbents are
reappointed or when neither of them is reappointed. The equilibrium election probabilities
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in the state  = D are given by
PDD = P (fpE   CpC  aE   CaCg \ fpC   EpE  aC   EaEg)+
P (fpE   CpC < aE   CaCg \ fpC   EpE < aC   EaEg) =
P (f"E   C"C  0g \ f"C   E"E  0g)+
P (f"E   C"C < 0g \ f"C   E"E < 0g) =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"E C"C ;"C E"E (x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"E C"C ;"C E"E (x; y) dxdy =
1
2   1 (arctanE + arctanC) ;
PDS = 1  PDD = 12 + 1 (arctanE + arctanC) ;
where arctan () is the arctangent function.
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Figure 1: Executive Es and congressman Cs reelection outcomes un-
der linear rules (E; bE) and (C ; bC) in the two-dimensional space of
performances pE and pC .
Figure 2: Best response functions of politicians i and j for independent
reelections (black), positively correlated reelections (red) and negatively
correlated reelections (blue) in states  = S and  = D.
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